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  • "Patent Docs" does not contain any legal advice whatsoever. This weblog is for informational purposes only, and its publication does not create an attorney-client relationship. In addition, nothing on "Patent Docs" constitutes a solicitation for business. This weblog is intended primarily for other attorneys. Moreover, "Patent Docs" is the personal weblog of the Authors; it is not edited by the Authors' employers or clients and, as such, no part of this weblog may be so attributed. All posts on "Patent Docs" should be double-checked for their accuracy and current applicability.

IP Litigation

May 14, 2008

Neuralstem Accusation Touches Nerve with StemCells

    By Donald Zuhn --

Stemcells Earlier this week, we reported on two recently filed patent cases:  the first by StemCells, Inc. against Neuralstem, Inc., asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,115,418 and 7,361,505, and the second being filed by Neuralstem, seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, unenforceability, and invalidity of the '505 patent.  The '505 patent, which is directed to multipotent neural stem cell compositions, was issued on April 22, 2008.

Neuralstem In a May 7th press release concerning its declaratory judgment filing, Neuralstem stated that StemCells "intentionally withheld crucial information highly material to the patentability of StemCells' 'new' patent," and did so with an intent to deceive the USPTO.  In particular, Neuralstem asserts in its complaint that StemCells failed to disclose "pending litigation with Neuralstem, the reexaminations filed by Neuralstem, and the prior art cited in those reexaminations" (the litigation and reexaminations are discussed below).  With respect to the prior art cited in the reexaminations, Neuralstem contended that the art was cited, but only after the issue fee for the '505 patent had been paid.  Neuralstem President and CEO Richard Garr contended that while "it is clear that we are not infringing this patent, . . . the threatening statements in [StemCells'] press release of April 23rd leave the misleading impression that we would require a license from them as a result of the issuance of this patent," and "[n]othing could be further from the truth."

Neural_stem_cells The newly filed cases do not mark the first time that the two companies have squared off in court.  In 2006, StemCells filed suit against Neuralstem, asserting infringement of four other neural stem cell patents.  Neuralstem responded to that suit by filing requests for ex parte reexamination of all four of the asserted patents.  Last month, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued a Notice of Intent to Issue an Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate for two of the four StemCells patents.  The two companies quickly issued competing press releases asserting that the USPTO had upheld the patents with only minor changes (according to StemCells) or with "numerous substantial changes" (according to Neuralstem).

On May 6th, Neuralstem announced that it had filed a motion to reopen the 2006 lawsuit, which had been stayed pending the outcome of the reexamination proceedings.  Neuralstem CEO Richard Garr contended that "the recent actions of the U.S. Patent Office now entitle [Neuralstem] to summary judgment in the case," and that "[c]ompletely contrary to the public statements made by StemCells, Inc., the Patent Office actions have destroyed the basis for the infringement suit filed by StemCells, Inc."  In a May 12th press release, Neuralstem reiterated its position "that actions of the Patent Office have destroyed the basis for [StemCells'] infringement assertions against [Neuralstem]."

In response to Neuralstem's May 7th press release, StemCells issued its own statement, announcing that it had filed suit against Neuralstem in the Northern District of California with claims for patent infringement, libel, and unfair competition.  In its statement, StemCells contended that "Neuralstem’s repeated false statements and public accusations over the past year, culminating in its allegations on the procurement of the ‘505 patent this month, together with its continued and willful infringement of StemCells’ intellectual property, necessitated the Company’s California action."  In response to Neuralstem's assertion that StemCells was unwilling to reopen the 2006 (implying that the reexamination result had been less than favorable for StemCells), StemCells President and CEO Martin McGlynn stated that "[o]nce the reexaminations of all [four] patents have been fully settled, we will move to reopen the Maryland litigation and have our day in court."  For now, it appears that the battle between the two companies is far from over.

For additional information about this and other related topics, please see:
• "Neuralstem Announces Grant of European Patent for Neural Stem Cells," April 30, 2008
• "StemCells Announces Issuance of Human Neural Stem Cell Patent," April 24, 2008
• "StemCells' Patents Survive Reexam -- StemCells and Neuralstem Differ on Extent of Changes," April 22, 2008

May 07, 2008

USPTO to Appeal Tafas/GSK v. Dudas

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Uspto_seal The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office filed a Notice of Appeal today with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging the decision of Judge William Cacheris of the Eastern District of Virginia permanently enjoining the continuation and claims rules as being outside the scope of their statutory authority.  The Federal Circuit is expected to notice a briefing schedule, and invite amicus briefing, once it receives the record from the District Court.

Federal_circuit It is unlikely that the matter will be finally resolved for several months, and quite possibly not until the change of administration.  Additionally, Judge Cacheris made his decision on only one of several grounds raised by the plaintiffs, Dr. Tafas and GlaxoSmithKline, making it likely that the Federal Circuit will remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.  It is unlikely that the injunction barring implementation of the rules will be lifted before the District Court has ruled on these alternative grounds for relief.

For information regarding this topic, please see:

• "BIO Responds to Events of the Day," April 1, 2008
• "No April Fool's Joke -- Tafas and GSK Win on Summary Judgment," April 1, 2008
• "PLI's John White Discusses Tafas/GSK v. Dudas," February 11, 2008
• "Judge Cacheris Takes GSK Case under Advisement," February 8, 2008
• "GSK Summary Judgment Hearing Set for Friday Morning," February 7, 2008
• "New Briefing Deadline Set In PTO Rules Case," December 18, 2007
• "Court Sets Summary Judgment Schedule in New Rules Case," December 3, 2007
• "No Discovery in New Rules Case," November 27, 2007
• "Tafas v. Dudas; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Dudas (E.D. Va. 2007)," October 31, 2007
• "USPTO Late to Its Own Party," October 31, 2007
• "GSK Secures Injunction," October 31, 2007 (includes links to Court's Order and Opinion)
• "Senator Schumer Sends a Signal," October 30, 2007
• "GSK TRO/Preliminary Injunction Hearing," October 29, 2007
• "AIPLA Supports GSK's Lawsuit Against the Patent Office's New Rules," October 25, 2007
• "GSK Brings Out the Big Guns Opposing the New Continuation and Claims Rules," October 24, 2007
• "Hooray! - (Finally) the Big Dogs Have Joined the Hunt," October 11, 2007
• "Rules Challenger Amends Complaint and Withdraws PI Motion," September 11, 2007
• "Inventor Sues PTO to Prevent New Continuation and Claims Rules from Taking Effect," August 30, 2007

April 28, 2008

How to Avoid a Permanent Injunction: The Lessons of Amgen v. Hoffmann-LaRoche

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Supreme_court_justices In rendering its decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. that the Federal Circuit's rubric that a patentee victory in a patent infringement lawsuit rendered the grant of a permanent injunction against the defendant almost "automatic," it is likely that the Supreme Court intended merely to adhere more closely to the distinction in statutory language between 35 U.S.C. §§ 283 and 284.  Specifically, Congress mandated that a prevailing patentee would be entitled to money damages for infringement ("the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement"), but left injunctive relief to the court's discretion ("[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity").  The Supreme Court's directive appeared merely to require the Federal Circuit to employ the conventional equitable considerations in granting injunctions under the patent statutes.  However, as related in a recent post, in its application the eBay decision appears to have other, likely unintended, consequences (see "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction").Roche

Hoffmann-LaRoche was the losing party last October in a jury verdict of infringement brought by Amgen, asserting four patents in its erythropoietin arsenal.  That verdict found Roche's Mircera® drug product (a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol) infringed claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698 (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge").  Pursuant to that verdict, Amgen pursued a permanent injunction to prevent Roche from launching Mircera®, because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration granted approval for Roche to market Mircera® last November.

District_of_massachusetts Instead of granting a permanent injunction, Judge Young of the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction on February 28, 2008, based on his application of the rubrics set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay for granting injunctions in patent cases.  In Amgen, Judge Young held that Amgen had clearly fulfilled three of the four factors mandated for consideration by the Supreme Court in eBay:  Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages; and the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction.  However, the District Court did not decide in Amgen's favor as to the fourth prong, the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Mircera On March 20, Roche complied with the requirements the District Court imposed in order for the Court to consider lifting the injunction (see "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction").  These included that Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5%; Roche's sales to Medicare patients would be at a cost no more than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products (a requirement that would prevent Roche from passing its royalty obligations onto patients, but would not prevent Roche from selling Mircera® at a bargain price relative); Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Amgen's Epogen® product; Roche would pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen; and Roche would agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price.  However, in the face of the District Court's continuing inability to resolve the fourth eBay injunction factor (as evidenced by the District Court's order that the parties submit a list of agreed candidates to be a "special master" to consider the scope of any injunction), Roche filed its notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit (see "Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit").  The status of the injunction is thus in some doubt.  Amgen has informed the District Court that it would move to amend its complaint to seek damages, including enhanced damages for willful infringement, should Roche launch Mircera® before the case has been resolved.

As part of its brief indicating that it would comply with the conditions the District Court set for lifting the injunction, Roche advanced an argument that may resonate with other "generic" drug defendants.  Roche particularly argued that Mircera® had dosing and cost advantages that should be considered to be in the public interest, including a better dosing schedule (according to Roche, the difference between 12 (for Mircera®) and 156 (for Epogen®) injections per year for dialysis patients), concomitant reduced Medicare and Medicaid costs, and fewer adverse effects as well as meeting unmet medical needs (relating to Amgen's failure to secure FDA approval for monthly dosing for certain indications).

It will almost always be the case that a true generic drug manufacturer will be able to argue that the public has an interest in cheaper and more plentiful sources of drugs.  Even small decreases in drug prices can have a major impact, particularly in the public sector:  every cent saved on the cost of a patented drug disbursed through Medicare is a public savings, and with millions of Medicare recipients this rapidly becomes "real money."  The economics of this situation will only increase as more and more of the "baby boom" generation becomes eligible for (and begins to receive) Medicare benefits.  Thus, by mandating that courts apply conventional equitable principles in considering injunctions to prevailing patentees, the Supreme Court may have provided generic companies an avenue to convince a court that the public interest in cheaper drugs outweighs the patentee's (and the public's) interest in upholding patent rights.

At present, the statutory scheme grants a 30-month regulatory approval ban against a generic ANDA filer.  The ban is triggered by a patentee filing suit in response to receiving the generic drug company's Paragraph IV certification after filing an ANDA.  Since many pharmaceutical patent lawsuits take more than 30 months to be resolve, the FDA can grant approval to the generic before the Orange Book-listed patent has expired (35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)) or the outcome of the lawsuit has been determined.  However, particularly before resolution of an ANDA patent infringement lawsuit (which carries no entitlement to damages before a generic enters the market, and is triggered by the mere filing of an ANDA), generic drug companies are typically loathe to launch "at risk" of being liable not only for damages but enhanced damages for willful infringement (35 U.S.C. § 285).  Congress has amended the Hatch-Waxman Act before, however (most recently Medicare Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003).  The (favorable) economic consequences of permitting early generic entry (for the public, not the patentee) might be the occasion for additional modifications, including permitting an infringing generic drug maker to enter the market under the same type of "compulsory license" that Judge Young was considering in the Amgen case.  The fact that such a result would upset the balance of interests that motivated the Hatch-Waxman scheme may not be enough to forestall this result, particularly in view of the complete disregard for this balance evinced by the Supreme Court in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences (see "Merck v. Integra: The Supreme Court Misses a Golden Opportunity").

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Glasses Half-full or Half-empty: Hoffman-LaRoche's Different Interpretation of Pfizer v. Teva," April 15, 2008
• "Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit," April 11, 2008
• "Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?" March 31, 2008
• "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction," March 26, 2008
• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

April 16, 2008

Innogenetics and Abbott Settle Dispute over HCV Technology

    By Robert Dailey --

Innogenetics Innogenetics and Abbott have agreed to settle their dispute over Innogenetics' patented methods for genotyping HCV.  Abbott will shell out $9.5 million, including on-going royalty payments for each test sold by Abbott.

Abbott We have previously discussed developments in the litigation between Innogenetics and Abbott over U.S. Patent 5,846,704 (see links below).  In January, the Federal Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's findings of validity and infringement.  Yet the Federal Circuit dissolved the injunction and remanded the case for a mini-trial on anticipation.  We speculated that the dissolution of the injunction could likely expedite settlement negotiations. 

On the news of the settlement, Innogenetics stock jumped from € 3.95 to € 4.25, but has since fallen back to pre-settlement values.  Innogenetics stock has lost about one-third of its value within the past three months.  The Belgian biotech company probably hoped that this week's settlement would boost share value.  The market appears not to have welcomed the deal, however.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs. (Fed. Cir. 2008)," January 17, 2008
• "Federal Circuit Reinstates Injunction in favor of Innogenetics," March 9, 2007
• "Innogenetics Appeals Its Win over Abbott," January 30, 2007
• "Permanent Injunction Issued against Abbott HCV Genotyping Test Kit," January 12, 2007
• "Innogenetics Wins $7 Million Judgment against Abbott for Infringing HCV Genotyping Method," January 8, 2007

More information can also be found in a report by Reuters.

April 15, 2008

Glasses Half-full or Half-empty: Hoffman-LaRoche's Different Interpretation of Pfizer v. Teva

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Roche Before Hoffmann-LaRoche filed its Notice of Appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit last week, appealing the preliminary injunction Judge William Young entered that prevents Roche from selling its Mircera® drug product (a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol), Roche filed a brief with the District Court regarding its interpretation of the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.  This filing was in part a response to Amgen's brief, filed in the District Court on March 14th regarding the effect of the Federal Circuit's Pfizer decision on the propriety of the preliminary injunction and the underlying competence of Amgen's verdict that its claims are not invalid (see Patent Docs report).

Roche's position is simple:  the Pfizer decision limits the application of the "safe harbor" provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 121 to divisional applications.  Roche's brief cites the multiple instances where the Court recited this proposition:

• Pfizer argues that the terms "divisional" and "continuation-in-part" are merely labels used for administrative convenience, and that accordingly, although . . . termed a CIP, [its application] is in effect a divisional for purposes of section 121.  In other words, Pfizer contends that the term "divisional application" as it is used in section 121 refers broadly to any type of continuing application filed as a result of a restriction, regardless of whether it is labeled by the PTO, for administrative purposes, as a divisional, a continuation, or a CIP.  We disagree.  Pfizer, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4969, at *14 (emphasis added).

• As the Federal Circuit explicitly held: "We conclude that the protection afforded by section 121 to applications (or patents issued therefrom) filed as a result of a restriction requirement is limited to divisional applications."  Pfizer, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4969, at *21-22 (emphasis added).

• As the Federal Circuit reasoned:

Section 121 explicitly refers to "divisional applications."  [Quoting statute and emphasizing each use of the term "divisional application"] . . . . That safe harbor, by its literal terms, protects only "divisional application[s]" . . . and patents issued on such applications.

The legislative history of section 121, like section 121 itself, refers specifically to "divisional application[s]." . . . There is no suggestion . . . in the legislative history of section 121 that the safe-harbor provision was, or needed to be, directed at anything but divisional applications.  Id. at *14-19.

• Amgen correctly notes that the Federal Circuit "stressed that [the] difference between a divisional application and a CIP application 'was well known at the time that Congress enacted the 1952 Patent Act,' and therefore '[i]f the drafters wanted to include CIPs within the protection afforded by section 121, they could have easily done so.'"  What Amgen fails to point out, however, is that the difference between a divisional application and a continuation application was equally well known.  Thus, for the identical reason, "[i]f the drafters wanted to include" continuation applications "within the protection afforded by section 121, they could have easily done so."  They did not:  "Despite this awareness . . . the drafters of section 121 chose to refer specifically and only to divisional . . . applications."

• As the text of the opinion makes clear:

Although the legislative history reveals no reason why Congress drafted section 121 only to benefit divisional applications, there are certainly plausible reasons why Congress would have concluded that section 121 should be limited to divisional applications, and not include CIPs.  Pfizer, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4969, at *19.

Amgen The argument is straightforward:  the statute only encompasses divisional applications.  This is in direct contradiction to Amgen's position, which was that this decision has no bearing on the District Court's decision that Amgen's patents-in-suit are not invalid under the judicially-created obviousness-type double patenting doctrine.  Amgen argued that its applications were not CIPs, but continuations, and that the Pfizer decision was limited to precluding the § 121 safe harbor from encompassing CIP applications.  Amgen also argued that its patents-in-suit were continuation applications in name only, and satisfied the conditions of the statute for benefiting from the safe harbor ("later application[s] carved out of a pending application," containing claims to "a distinct and independent invention" and "disclosing and claiming only subject matter disclosed in the earlier or parent application").  Roche's brief does not deign to address these contentions directly, taking the more direct route of asserting sub silentio that Amgen's arguments were irrelevant in the face of the Pfizer decision's simple holding.

Roche's brief does seek to refute Amgen's contention that the interpretation Roche wishes to have applied to the Pfizer decision -- that the § 121 safe harbor is limited to divisional applications -- is inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's earlier decisions in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Amgen argued that any interpretation (such as the one Roche argues here) cannot be correct in view of this purported inconsistency, since three-judge panels of the Federal Circuit are bound by the earlier decisions, citing Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned in banc.  Where there is direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first.").  Roche argues that there is no inconsistency, since neither Applied Materials nor Symbol Technologies involved continuation applications, but rather concerned divisional applications (albeit the patents-in-suit were continuations claiming priority to divisional applications).  This approach is consistent with positions Roche asserted before the District Court, to the effect that Amgen was precluded from the safe harbor under § 121 because it designated its applications as continuations rather than divisionals.  Roche does not reach the substance of Amgen's argument regarding whether the relevant patents-in-suit satisfy the requirements for divisional applications.

Finally, Roche argues that the Pfizer decision also expressly supports its interpretation of the decision in Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), that the District Court's determination of whether claims in the patents-in-suit fall within the ambit of obviousness-type double patenting can rely on disclosure in the parent specification as well as the parent's granted claims.

As noted in an earlier post, the lawyer representing Pfizer before the Federal Circuit, Leora Ben-Ami, Kaye Scholer LLP, is also the lead trial attorney representing Hoffman-LaRoche against Amgen.  Roche's brief was filed by local counsel, Bromberg & Sunstein LLP.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit," April 11, 2008
• "Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?" March 31, 2008
• "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction," March 26, 2008
• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

April 11, 2008

Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Roche Hoffmann-LaRoche has apparently given up its attempts to convince Judge William Young to lift an injunction preventing it from selling its Mircera® drug product (a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol), and has filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Amgen On October 23, 2007, Amgen procured a jury verdict that Mircera® infringed several Amgen patents (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge"), and the District Court granted Amgen a preliminary injunction on February 28, 2008.  In granting the injunction, Judge Young indicated that Amgen had clearly fulfilled three of the four factors mandated for consideration by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., (Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages; and the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction).  However, the District Court did not decide in Amgen's favor as to the fourth prong, the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Mircera The District Court set five conditions that Roche needed to fulfill before it would lift the injunction, and Roche ultimately agreed to all the Court's conditions (see "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction").  Amgen responded by informing the District Court that it intended to pursue its right to a jury determination of the money damages it is entitled to should Roche launch under a modified injunction, stating that the Court did not have the power to deny Amgen its statutorily-defined profits, and that Amgen would also seek treble damages for any Roche sales made pursuant to the Court's order as constituting willful infringement.  And the District Court further postponed a final decision on lifting the injunction on March 31, 2008, issuing an order that it intended to appoint a special master to consider the question of how dosing and pricing of Amgen's and Roche's products should be compared.  The District Court gave the parties 15 days to submit a list of "agreed" candidates to be appointed special master, and then the Court intended to give that candidate another 60 days to make the inquiries necessary to provide his or her findings to the Court.  Only after at least a 75-day delay could the Court be expected to make its ruling.  Presumably, this order has been mooted by Roche's appeal (since Judge Young originally set a timetable for considering lifting the injunction conditioned on the parties not filing a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit).

In addition to its public interest argument, Roche can be expected to respond to Amgen's arguments submitted to the District Court on March 14th (see "Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?") regarding the effect of the Federal Circuit's Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. decision on the propriety of the preliminary injunction and the underlying competence of Amgen's verdict that its claims are not invalid.  The Federal Circuit in Pfizer construed the scope of the "safe harbor" provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 121 to be limited to divisional applications and not to include continuation-in-part applications; it did not directly decide the question with regard to continuation applications.

Amgen argued that this decision has no bearing on the District Court's decision that Amgen's patents-in-suit are not invalid under the judicially-created obviousness-type double patenting doctrine.  Amgen also argued that its applications were not CIPs but continuations, and that the Pfizer decision was limited to precluding the § 121 safe harbor from encompassing CIP applications.  Amgen further argued that its patents-in-suit were continuation applications in name only, and satisfied the conditions of the statute for benefitting from the safe harbor ("later application[s] carved out of a pending application," containing claims to "a distinct and independent invention" and "disclosing and claiming only subject matter disclosed in the earlier or parent application").  Finally, Amgen argued that the Pfizer decision is inconsistent with Federal Circuit precedent, with regard to continuation applications, in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Adv. Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563 (1996) and Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and that the Court is bound by the earlier decisions, citing Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned in banc.  Where there is direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first.").  Roche no doubt disagrees, and the controversy adds yet another ground for its attack on Amgen's patents, its verdict, and its injunction.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?" March 31, 2008
• "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction," March 26, 2008
• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

April 08, 2008

Codon Devices and Blue Heron Biotechnology Settle Patent Suit

    By Sherri Oslick --

Codon_devices Last week, Codon Devices Inc. and Blue Heron Biotechnology agreed to settle their pending lawsuit in which Codon alleged that a series of patents licensed to Codon were infringed through Blue Heron’s manufacture and use of its GeneMaker® gene synthesis platform.  As reported here, the suit was filed on March 14, 2007 in the District Court of Delaware.

Blueheron Under the terms of the settlement, Codon has granted Blue Heron a release with respect to past activity as well as a perpetual, fully-paid sublicense to continue to use error correction technology as currently employed in Blue Heron’s commercial gene synthesis activities.  Additionally, Codon is to request that the Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  No financial terms were disclosed.

For additional information regarding the settlement, please see:

• Blue Heron's press release
• "Blue Heron Denies Infringement," March 19, 2007

March 31, 2008

Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Amgen On October 23, 2007, Amgen procured a jury verdict that Hoffman-LaRoche's Mircera® drug product infringed several Amgen patents.  That verdict found Mircera® infringed claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698.  Amgen's infringed claims were directed to recombinant methods and recombinant EPO protein, and Roche's Mircera® drug product is a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol.

Mircera Since then, Amgen has moved in the District Court for a permanent injunction against Roche to prevent Mircera® from being sold in the U.S. until the last of Amgen's infringed patents has expired; Roche has opposed.  Such an injunction is necessary to prevent Mircera® from going on the market, since the U.S. Food and Drug Administration last November granted approval for Roche to market Mircera® in the U.S.  The Court granted a preliminary injunction barring Mircera® sales on February 28, 2008, but Judge Young left open the possibility that he would modify his order under certain circumstances.  Although the District Court found that Amgen had fulfilled three of the four factors mandated for consideration by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (i.e., Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages; and the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction), the District Court did not decide in Amgen's favor as to the fourth prong, the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Roche The District Court also set forth five conditions that, if fulfilled by Roche, might persuade the Court to lift the injunction.  First, Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5% (Amgen having already rejected an offer for a 20% royalty from Roche).  Second, Roche could be introduced to the Medicare patient population at a cost no more than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products (sold under the names Epogen® and Aranesp®) (a requirement that would prevent Roche from passing its royalty obligations onto patients, but would not prevent Roche from selling Mircera® at a bargain price relative to Epogen®).  Third, Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Epogen®.  Fourth, Roche would pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen.  Finally, Roche would agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price (presumably, this is a provision that would prevent Roche from abandoning the Medicare market once it has entered it).

Roche agreed to these conditions in its court filing on March 20th (see "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction").  Despite Roche's acquiescence, and perhaps in the face of Amgen's vigorously-pressed argument that lifting the injunction under these circumstances was, in effect, a compulsory license (see "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction"), the Court on Monday issued an order that the parties had fifteen days to submit an agreed list of potential special masters to consider the question of how dosing and pricing of Amgen's and Roche's products should be compared.  While not being related directly to the public interest question, the special master's report should further inform the Court of whether it will be practicable for the Court to conform its injunction (or compulsory license) to the economic realities of the marketplace for ESAs.  The special master, once appointed, will have sixty days to make the inquiries necessary to provide his or her findings to the Court.  Presumably, the Court will then make its ruling.

Federal_circuit_seal The Federal Circuit's decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (issued March 7, 2008; see Patent Docs report) has raised another potentially-dispositive issue, not on the injunction but on the validity of Amgen's patents-in-suit, and Amgen has responded proactively.  On March 14th, Amgen filed a bench memorandum with the District Court explaining its understanding of the Pfizer decision, and arguing that this decision has no bearing on the Court's decisions that Amgen's patents-in-suit are not invalid under the judicially-created obviousness-type double patenting doctrine.  In Pfizer, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit invalidated one of Pfizer's patents as being invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.  In that case, the Federal Circuit opined that the "safe harbor" for divisional applications of 35 U.S.C. § 121 (i.e., that divisional applications are not subject to obviousness-type double patenting rejections) did not extend to continuation-in-part applications.  The CAFC based its decision in part on the plain language of the statute (which is limited to divisional applications), and on the grounds that, unlike a divisional application, a continuation-in-part application is not identical in disclosure to its parent.  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Congress did not evince an intention to permit an application having additional disclosure to benefit from the § 121 safe harbor.

Although the Federal Circuit's rationale was clearly based on this distinction between divisional and CIP applications, the Court's language was less than crystal clear on the status of continuation applications.  Such applications share with divisionals the limitation that their disclosure is coextensive with the disclosure of the parent application.  Unlike a divisional application (whose filing is compelled by a determination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that the application discloses more than one invention), however, continuation applications are filed at an applicant's volition, to pursue claims that the applicant has not been able to persuade the Patent Office are patentable within the examination time limit (i.e., before a final rejection has been issued).

Amgen argues in its bench memorandum that its patents do not fall within the ambit of the Pfizer Court's invalidating decision.  First, Amgen argues that its applications are continuations, not CIPs, and that the Pfizer decision was limited to precluding the § 121 safe harbor from encompassing CIP applications.  Second, Amgen argues that its applications, while termed "continuations" satisfy the requirements of divisional applications:  "the '178 and '179 applications were 'later application[s]' (than the '298 application), 'carved out of a pending application' (the '298 application), containing claims to 'a distinct and independent invention' (restriction Groups I and V, not Group II), and 'disclosing and claiming only subject matter disclosed in the earlier or parent application' (as 37 C.F.R. § 1.60 applications, the disclosure and claim language was identical to that in the parent '298 application)"  M.P.E.P. § 201.06.  (Amgen further argues that Pfizer cannot be taken to mean that how an application is designated, as a "continuation" or a "divisional," can by itself be enough to determine whether or not an application was entitled to § 121 safe harbor. Indeed, Amgen notes that the District Court expressly rejected Roche's argument that the parent applications to the '933 and '349 patents were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting "because Amgen's patent counsel failed to check the 'divisional application' box on the application cover forms.")   Amgen provides the following chart to show the relationship between its applications, as compared to the relationships between the Pfizer applications:

Pfizer_patent_family

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Amgen_patent_family_2

Amgen also argues that the Pfizer decision is inconsistent with Federal Circuit precedent, with regard to continuation applications, in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563 (1996) and Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  In these cases, Amgen argues, the § 121 safe harbor was applied to continuations that fulfilled the statutory requirements, providing the following diagrams of the relationships between the patents in those decisions:

Applied_material_patent_family

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Symbol_technologies_patent_famil_3

Amgen further argues that insofar as the Pfizer decision is inconsistent with either the Applied Materials or Symbol Technologies decisions, the Court is bound by the earlier decisions, citing Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned in banc.  Where there is direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first.").

Roche has not yet been heard on this issue.  Interestingly, the lawyer representing Pfizer before the Federal Circuit, Leora Ben-Ami of Kaye Scholer LLP, is also the lead trial attorney representing Hoffman-LaRoche against Amgen.

For now, the answer to the title question is "probably not," but it is clear that Amgen will once again be forced to vigorously protect its EPO franchise.

Patent Docs thanks Calvert (Cal) Crary of Litigationnotes.com for alerting us to this issue.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction," March 26, 2008
• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

March 26, 2008

Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Supreme_court_building_2 Obtaining an injunction against an adjudged infringer has become much more difficult for patentees since the Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.  This was to be expected, of course, since the Supreme Court mandated that district courts take into account the same factors (adequacy of money damages as a remedy, whether the patentee would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, the balance of the hardships between the parties, and the public interest) applied in other civil actions, which was in sharp contrast to the routine nature of granting permanent injunctions to prevailing plaintiffs under the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence (see, e.g., Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

Amgen Nowhere, perhaps, is this difficulty illustrated more starkly than in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Judge William G. Young, presiding) concerning Amgen's motion for permanent injunction to prevent Roche from launching its Mircera® drug product.  Amgen procured a jury judgment on October 23, 2007 that Mircera® infringed several Amgen patents.  That verdict found Roche's Mircera® infringed claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698.  Amgen's infringed claims were directed to recombinant methods and recombinant EPO protein, and Roche's Mircera® drug product is a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol.  In addition, the jury found that Roche had not sustained its burden of establishing that any of Amgen's asserted claims were invalid (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge").

Roche The District Court entered a preliminary injunction on February 28, 2008 foreclosing Roche from launching Mircera®; Roche had been granted approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to market Mircera® last November (it has already been approved in Europe and is sold in Austria, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway).  However, Judge Williams left open the possibility that he would modify his order under certain circumstances.  He assessed whether Amgen was entitled to an injunction using the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay, expressly finding that Amgen satisfied three of the four requirements (Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages; and the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction).  However, the District Court did not decide in Amgen's favor as to the fourth prong, the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Indeed, the District Court did not decide at all, rather putting the parties on notice that, in the absence of appellate jurisdiction by the Federal Circuit, it was inclined to at least consider modifying the injunction within 30 days (i.e., by March 30th), provided that Roche was willing to agree to the following conditions.  First, Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5% (Amgen having already rejected an offer for a 20% royalty from Roche (see "Amgen Rejects Roche's Micera [sic] License Payment Offer").  Second, Roche could be introduced to the Medicare patient population at a cost no more than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products (sold under the names Epogen® and Aranesp®) -- a requirement that would prevent Roche from passing its royalty obligations onto patients, but would not prevent Roche from selling Mircera® at a bargain price relative to Epogen®.  Third, Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the District Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Epogen®.  Fourth, Roche would pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen.  Finally, Roche would agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price (presumably, this is a provision that would prevent Roche from abandoning the Medicare market once it has entered it).

Mircera Roche agreed to these conditions in its court filing last week (see "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction"), arguing that first, Mircera® was not simply a generic version of Epogen® but rather was an independently developed (and patented) "new molecule" having significant advantages over Amgen's products.  Second, Roche argued that Mircera® had dosing and cost advantages that should be considered to be in the public interest, including a better dosing schedule (according to Roche, the difference between 12 (for Mircera®) and 156 (for Epogen®) injunctions per year for dialysis patients), concomitant reduced Medicare and Medicaid costs, and fewer adverse effects as well as satisfying unmet medical needs (relating to Amgen's failure to secure FDA approval for monthly dosing for certain indications).  Third, Roche argued that Amgen had enjoyed an effective patent life of 28 years from its earliest filing date, and that this term was contrary to current public policy that limited patent term to 20 years from the earliest filing date.  Roche also took the occasion to argue that Amgen had "unclean hands" and thus was not entitled to the equitable remedy of an injunction, based on commercial activities in promoting its erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs).

For its part, Amgen countered by casting the proposed modification as a compulsory license in favor of Roche.  Amgen argued that it would be inequitable to "reward" Roche, an adjudged infringer, with such a license.  Moreover, Amgen argued that compulsory licensing was not within the province or the power of the District Court to impose, but that it could either grant or deny the injunction and nothing more.  Congress, Amgen argued, had several times considered introducing compulsory licensing provisions into the patent statute but had not, and Amgen argued that the District Court did not have the power to impose such a license in the face of Congressional disapproval, citing in support of this argument the Federal Circuit's decision in Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, which struck down restrictions on drug pricing as being contrary to the balancing of consumer costs and patent incentives that were Congress's prerogative to make.  Amgen argued that the District Court must also consider as part of the public harm the harm to innovation that would be caused by the precedent of having an infringer rewarded with a compulsory license, and contrasted this harm with what it termed the speculative medical and financial benefits (which it proffered evidence from the trial record to refute) that Roche used in support of its public interest argument.  Amgen countered these claims with argument citing harm to the American economy, jobs, and tax base that would be occasioned by permitting Roche to produce Mircera® overseas and import it into the U.S. for sale in competition with Amgen's ESA products.  (In a related action, the Federal Circuit held last week that the International Trade Commission should consider the extent to which Roche's importation of Mircera® was not within the scope of the "safe harbor" provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); see Patent Docs report.)  Amgen supported its argument with evidence from "secondary sources," including economic analyses, academic studies, Congressional Budget Office data, and policy papers, all to the effect that innovator drug companies rely on market exclusivity provided by patenting to support research and development of blockbuster drugs, and that the compulsory license occasioned by the District Court's proposed modification of its injunction would endanger Amgen's ability to obtain the financing required for new drug discovery.

Seal It seems that these arguments did nothing to help the District Court come to a decision on whether it should modify its preliminary injunction.  Instead, in an order entered today, the Court decided it needed to appoint a special master to consider the question of how dosing and pricing of Amgen's and Roche's products should be compared.  This question is not related to the public interest directly, but should further inform the Court of whether it will be practicable for the Court to conform its injunction (or compulsory license) to the economic realities of the marketplace for ESAs.  The Court gave the parties fifteen days to submit a list of "agreed" candidates to be appointed special master, and then the Court intends to give that candidate another sixty days to make the inquiries necessary to provide his or her findings to the Court.  Presumably, the Court will then make its ruling.

By again delaying the Court's ultimate decision, today's order keeps Mircera® off the market for at least another 75 days.  Moreover, Amgen has informed the Court that it intended to pursue its right to a jury determination of the money damages it is entitled to should Roche launch under a modified injunction, stating that the Court did not have the power to deny Amgen its statutorily-defined profits (which were 2-4 fold higher than the Court's proposed 22.5% royalty), and that Amgen would also seek treble damages for any Roche sales made pursuant to the Court's order as constituting willful infringement.  Amgen also stated it intends to ask the Court to stay any modification of the injunction to permit it time to appeal the injunction to the Federal Circuit.

Supreme_court_building_3 It is difficult to understand the Supreme Court's eBay decision as intending (or anticipating) that a District Court would undertake setting out the type of modified "injunction" that Judge Williams is contemplating here, as being in the nature of a compulsory license.  Importantly, of course, all the District Court's ruling will do is to refuse to prohibit Roche from marketing Mircera® provided that it complies with the pricing and other affirmative provisions of the Court's order.  This is not a license, however, but simply the limits to which the Court is willing to enjoin Roche (i.e., it will not enjoin Roche under the terms of the injunction).  But whatever Judge Williams does, Amgen's intention to press its damages and willful infringement claims are certain to place before the Federal Circuit (and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court) the issue of how far a District Court may go in fashioning a remedy having the properties of a compulsory license.  There is some poetic justice in the possibility that the Supreme Court may have to address, and right soon, the consequences of eBay and its philosophical inclination to be parsimonious with regard to patent rights.  In view of the Supreme Court's recent track record, however, any such thirst for justice should be strongly tempered with trepidation about how much further the Supreme Court may be willing to restrict a patentee's right to exclude.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

March 25, 2008

Alnylam CEO Forecasts "Perfect Storm" for Biomedical Patents

    By Donald Zuhn --

Maraganore_john In an Op-Ed piece appearing in last Saturday's edition of The Boston Globe, Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc. Chief Executive Officer Dr. John Maraganore (at right) wrote about a "perfect storm" that is building against biomedical patent protection.  In an article entitled, "Good for iPods, but bad for patients," Dr. Maraganore asserted that "[p]ending decisions by the Supreme Court, the patent office, and Congress could fundamentally change the ground rules for patent protection within the life sciences industry to such a degree that in a decade we may not have an industry remaining."

Bostonglobe_logo Alluding to KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. and MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Dr. Maraganore contended that the Supreme Court had "significantly shifted the 'goal line' for inventiveness standards in patents, making it much harder for patents to be awarded," and had "destabilized patent licensing."  With respect to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's attempt last year to promulgate its draconian continuation and claims rules, the Alnylam CEO argued that the Office was "seeking to change its review process for patent applications by placing shorter limitations on the needed time it takes to invent biotechnological innovations."  Finally, Dr. Maraganore pointed to the efforts in the House and Senate to enact legislation that would "introduce new ways to challenge issued patents after their issuance, resulting in prolonged periods of patent uncertainty," as well as "limit the scope of damages to those who violate patents, encouraging a lackadaisical attitude among infringers."

Dr. Maraganore places the blame for the patent reform bills squarely at the feet of the information technology industry, which he asserts has a view of patents (i.e., they are little more than a nuisance) that is fundamentally at odds with the view held by the biotech industry.  He argues that "the patent changes sought by information technology firms would be nothing short of disastrous for the millions of patients around the world that have benefited from biomedical breakthroughs in diagnosing, treating, and curing disease."

Noting that biotech companies spend about $750 million over a decade to generate a single drug, Dr. Maraganore contends that the development of new medicines is only possible because of the availability of substantial capital investments, which in turn are only possible because of the financial incentives that patents provide to investors.  Dr. Maraganore concludes by encouraging the Senate to "reject or substantially alter the pending bill in light of its potentially devastating impact upon biomedical research," and take the time needed to evaluate the consequences of recent Supreme Court rulings on patent protection.

Perfectstorm While Dr. Maraganore may be the first to describe the actions of the three branches of government as constituting components of a biomedical patent perfect storm, he is not the first to point out this three-pronged attack on the U.S. patent system.  For example, last spring we reported on a white paper issued by the California Health Institute which concludes that a handful of Supreme Court decisions, Congress' attempt to enact patent reform legislation, and the Patent Office's push for new patent rules would combine to reduce the value of life sciences patents and thereby have a "chilling effect on biomedical investment and innovation."  Nevertheless, Dr. Maraganore should be commended for adding his voice to the debate, as well as for providing us with such an apt metaphor.

March 20, 2008

Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Roche_2 On Tuesday, Roche filed its brief in support of U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Judge William G. Young, presiding) modifying its preliminary injunction granted on February 28th, barring Roche from launching its FDA-approved Mircera® drug product.  The Court's preliminary injunction was entered pursuant to a jury judgment on October 23, 2007 that Mircera® infringed several Amgen patents.  That verdict found Roche's Mircera® infringed claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698.  Amgen's infringed claims were directed to recombinant methods and recombinant EPO protein, and Roche's Mircera® drug product is a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol.  In addition, the jury found that Roche had not sustained its burden of establishing that any of Amgen's asserted claims were invalid (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge").

Mircera Absent this jury verdict, Roche would be in a position to launch Mircera®, because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration granted approval for Roche to market Mircera® last Novmber (it has already been approved in Europe and is sold in Austria, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway).  Judge Young foreclosed this option when he imposed the preliminary injunction on February 28th.  However, Judge Young also left open the possibility that he would modify his order under certain circumstances.  He assessed whether Amgen was entitled to an injunction using the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., expressly finding that Amgen satisfied three of the four requirements (Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages; and the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction).  More difficult was the fourth prong, the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Erythropoietin The Court put the parties on notice that, in the absence of appellate jurisdiction by the Federal Circuit, it was inclined to at least consider modifying the injunction within 30 days (i.e., by March 30th), provided that Roche was willing to agree to the following conditions.  First, Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5% (Amgen having already rejected an offer for a 20% royalty from Roche (see "Amgen Rejects Roche's Micera [sic] License Payment Offer").  Second, Roche could be introduced to the Medicare patient population at a cost no more than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products (sold under the names Epogen® and Aranesp®) (a requirement that would prevent Roche from passing its royalty obligations onto patients, but would not prevent Roche from selling Mircera® at a bargain price relative to Epogen®).  Third, Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Epogen®.  Fourth, Roche would pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen.  Finally, Roche would agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price (presumably, this is a provision that would prevent Roche from abandoning the Medicare market once it has entered it).

Roche agreed to these conditions in its court filing today, and took the occasion to present two arguments to the Court in support of lifting the injunction.  First, Roche argued strenuously that Mircera® was not simply a generic version of Epogen® but rather was an independently developed (and patented) "new molecule" having significant advantages over Amgen's products.  Roche particularly argued that Mircera® had dosing and cost advantages that should be considered to be in the public interest, including a better dosing schedule (according to Roche, the difference between 12 (for Mircera®) and 156 (for Epogen®) injections per year for dialysis patients), concomitant reduced Medicare and Medicaid costs, and fewer adverse effects as well as meeting unmet medical needs (relating to Amgen's failure to secure FDA approval for monthly dosing for certain indications).  Roche also argued that Amgen's commercial activities in promoting its erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) constituted patent misuse and "unclean hands" that should discount whatever private equities cut in favor of making the injunction permanent.  Roche also argued that Amgen had enjoyed an effective patent life of 28 years from its earliest filing date, and that this term was contrary to current public policy that limited patent term to 20 years from the earliest filing date.

Amgen_2 For its part, Amgen countered by casting the proposed modification as a compulsory license in favor of Roche.  Amgen argued that it would be inequitable to "reward" Roche, an adjudged infringer, with such a license.  Moreover, Amgen argued that compulsory licensing was not within the province or the power of the Court to impose, but that it could either grant or deny the injunction and nothing more.  Congress, Amgen argued, had several times considered introducing compulsory licensing provisions into the patent statute but had not, and Amgen argued that the Court did not have the power to impose such a license in the face of Congressional disapproval, citing in support of this argument the Federal Circuit's decision in Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia, which struck down restrictions on drug pricing as being contrary to the balancing of consumer costs and patent incentives that were Congress' prerogative to make.  Amgen argued that the Court must also consider as part of the public harm the harm to innovation that would be caused by the precedent of having an infringer rewarded with a compulsory license, and contrasted this harm with what it termed the speculative medical and financial benefits (which it proffered evidence from the trial record to refute) that Roche used in support of its public interest argument.  Amgen countered these claims with argument citing harm to the American economy, jobs, and tax base that would be occasioned by permitting Roche to produce Mircera® overseas and import it into the U.S. for sale in competition with Amgen's ESA products.  Amgen also asserted its right to a trial by a jury to determine the extent of damages it would be entitled to should Roche launch under a modified injunction, stating that the Court did not have the power to deny Amgen its statutorily-defined profits (which were 2-4 fold higher than the Court's 22.5% royalty), as well as treble damages for willful infringement.

Amgen also submitted evidence from "secondary sources," including economic analyses, academic studies, Congressional Budget Office data, and policy papers in support of its argument that innovator drug companies rely on market exclusivity provided by patenting to support research and development of blockbuster drugs, and that the compulsory license occasioned by the Court's proposed modification of its injunction would endanger Amgen's ability to obtain the financing required for new drug discovery.  Amgen also noted that Congress had recently considered but did not pass compulsory licensing bills introduced in anticipation of a possible "bird flu" epidemic, and for the antibiotic Cipro® in the wake of the anthrax bioterrorism scare following the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Both situations were more compelling than the evidence adduced by Roche in support of a compulsory license for Mircera®, according to Amgen, and Congress' failure to so enact compulsory licensing provisions should inform the Court's decision not to modify its injunction into a compulsory license.

The Court having said it would "consider" modifying its injunction, its failure to do so by March 30th would provide Roche with ample time to appeal; Amgen has said in its pleading that it will ask the Court to stay any modification to permit it time to appeal the modified injunction to the Federal Circuit.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007

March 02, 2008

Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Amgen_2 Last Friday, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Judge William G. Young, presiding) granted a preliminary injunction to Amgen against Hoffman La-Roche, preventing Roche from selling its Mircera® drug product, a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol.  Last November, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration granted approval for Roche to market Mircera® (it has already been approved in Europe and is sold in Austria, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway).  Roche had moved for the Court to permit it to launch (offering Amgen a 20% royalty), and there has been industry speculation that Roche might decide to launch at risk (see "Roche Plans to Launch Anemia Biologic Miceria [sic] in U.S. Despite Court Setback").  Neither of those options are available to Roche in the face of Judge Williams' injunction.

Mircera_logo The Court's injunction is pursuant to a jury judgment on October 23, 2007 that Mircera® infringed several Amgen patents.  That verdict found Roche's Mircera® infringed Claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698.  (Amgen's infringed claims were directed to recombinant methods and recombinant EPO protein.)  In addition, the jury found that Roche had not sustained its burden of establishing that any of Amgen's asserted claims were invalid (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge").

In its injunction order, the Court analyzed whether Amgen was entitled to an injunction using the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.  The District Court relied upon the jury verdict that Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; in addition, the Court found that Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages, and that the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction.  The most difficult prong for the Court to establish was the public interest, particularly in view of Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").

Roche The Court did not make the injunction permanent, however, and announced that it "may modify" the injunction in 30 days, unless the Federal Circuit exercises jurisdiction by accepting an appeal (presumably from Roche).  The District Court did indicate that it would impose the following conditions if it were persuaded (presumably by its considerations of the public interest) not to make the injunction permanent.  First, Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5%; on February 20th, Amgen rejected an offer for a 20% royalty from Roche (see "Amgen Rejects Roche's Micera [sic] License Payment Offer").  Second, Roche could be introduced to the Medicare patient population at a cost no less than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products (sold under the names Epogen® and Aranesp®) (a requirement that would prevent Roche from passing its royalty obligations onto patients, but would not prevent Roche from selling Mircera® at a bargain price relative to Epogen®).  Third, Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Epogen®.  Fourth, Roche must pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen.  Finally, Roche must agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price (presumably, this is a provision that would prevent Roche from abandoning the Medicare market once it has entered it).

The Court also denied the various post-judgment motions (for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial) by the parties.

February 08, 2008

Judge Cacheris Takes GSK Case under Advisement

    By Donald Zuhn --

Glaxosmithkline_gsk If you have been reading the reports placed by John White and Bob Spar over at the PLI Patent Blog, then you are probably already aware that Judge James C. Cacheris of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did not issue a decision today after hearing the parties’ summary judgment arguments.  As John White reported earlier today, Judge Cacheris announced that due to the mountain of papers filed in the case (the parties’ summary judgment, opposition, and reply briefs alone -- excluding exhibits -- number more than 600 pages, and numerous amici have filed briefs in the case), he was taking the case under advisement and would issue his decision as soon as possible.  Patent Docs will provide additional commentary as soon as the Court has issued a decision.

For additional information regarding today's hearing, please see:

  • Jill Browning's report at Patently-O.

February 07, 2008

Amgen Granted Leave to Introduce New Claims of Inequitable Conduct Against ARIAD

    By Sherri Oslick --

Seal Late last week, U.S. District Court Judge Mary Pat Thynge (D. Del.) granted leave to Amgen Inc. to amend and supplement its reply to ARIAD Pharmaceuticals Inc.'s counterclaims to include new claims of inequitable conduct.  In her order, Judge Thynge noted that Amgen pled affirmative acts of misconduct and evidence of intent sufficient to support its claim.

Amgen_2 Amgen filed its lawsuit for declaratory judgment of non-infringement (by Amgen’s Enbrel® and Kineret®) and invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 on April 20, 2006, on the heels of the jury trial in ARIAD Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., in which ARIAD asserted the ‘516 patent against Lilly based on Lilly’s Evista® and Xigris® products.  The ‘516 patent is currently undergoing reexamination with the USPTO.

Amgen’s new claim alleges inequitable conduct on the part of ARIAD for failing to disclose to the USPTO in the reexam proceedings certain deposition testimony of an expert who testified on ARIAD’s behalf at the Lilly trial, and for concealing information on patent validity.  More specifically, Amgen claims that ARIAD’s failure to disclose deposition testimony of Dr. Thomas Kadesch taken in an unrelated case, Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche (D. Mass).  Dr. Kadesch offered expert testimony in the Lilly case that the ‘516 patent was valid under 35 U.S.C. § 112.  In conjunction with his opinions regarding Section 112 issues in the Roche case, Dr. Kadesch was questioned regarding his testimony in the Lilly case.  According to Amgen’s allegations, Dr. Kadesch unequivocally recanted his testimony from the Lilly case, and ARIAD purposefully tried to prevent disclosure of this testimony to the USPTO, testimony that ran counter to ARIAD’s position in reexamination in support of patentability.

Ariad ARIAD did eventually submit Dr. Kadesch’s Roche deposition testimony to the USPTO, however Amgen asserts that it was included with a number of other items, with no attempt to advise the USPTO of any potential misrepresentations.  ARIAD opposed Amgen’s motion as moot, asserting that they had submitted Dr. Kadesch’s deposition testimony within a day of receiving clearance under the protective order in the Roche case.  Additionally, ARIAD asserted that Dr. Kadesch’s deposition testimony was not material to the reexam proceedings.  In granting Amgen’s motion, Judge Thynge noted that the issues of whether the testimony was material, or whether there was misrepresentation and the requisite intent, were questions of fact to be addressed by the Court.

For additional information regarding this topic, please see:

GSK Summary Judgment Hearing Set for Friday Morning

    By Kevin E. Noonan --

Eastern_district_of_virginia_seal District Court Judge James C. Cacheris of the Eastern District of